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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Nevertheless, where a private association has attained a monop-
oly of the real estate brokerage business by means of a multiple list-
ing which is made available only to members, such an association
occupies a quasi-public position and therefore has certain corre-
sponding obligations. It can no longer claim the same freedom
from legal restraint enjoyed by other private associations. Any
significant extension of the Grillo rationale is likely to have a pro-
found effect upon the practices of similar associations.
LLOYD D. MAZUR
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION -
FAIR HOUSING LEGISLATION
Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825,
50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
During the five years prior to 1964, the California legislature
enacted four pieces of fair housing legislation. The first, the Unruh
Civil Rights Act,' prohibited discrimination in all types of business
establishments, the second, the Hawkins Act,' extended this pro-
tection to specifically include public-assisted housing, while a third
act proscribed the use of racially restrictive covenants in written
instruments transferring real property.3  The fourth, the 1963
Rumford Fair Housing Act,4 further expressed the policies under-
lying the prior enactments by prohibiting racial discrimination in the
sale or rental of any private dwelling containing more than four
units.
In 1964 this legislative trend was halted when the California
voters, by state-wide ballot, approved the initiative measure which
appeared as "Proposition 14," rendering Civil Code sections 51 and
52 void. Following its passage, "Proposition 14" was incorporated
into the California Constitution, thereby prohibiting the state from
denying any person the right to decline to sell, lease, or rent his
real property to any person as he so chooses.' The constitutionality
' CAL. CIV. CODE 5§ 51-52.
2 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35700-41 (Supp. 1965).
3 CAL. CIV. CODE § 53.
4 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 55 35700-44 (Supp. 1965).
5 CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 26 (Supp. 1965), which provides as follows:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit
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of this provision was placed in issue in the subject case of Mulkey
v. Reitman6 in which the Negro plaintiffs had attempted to rent an
unoccupied apartment from the defendant proprietors but were de-
nied the accomodation solely on the basis of their race. The Su-
perior Court of Orange County, adhering to the provisions of article
I, section 26, of the California Constitution, denied the plaintiffs'
petition seeking to enjoin this discrimination. The California
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, striking down
the amendment as being contrary to the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
The rationale used by the California court follows from the
fourteenth amendment guarantee that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Since the decision in the Civil Rights Cases' which set forth the prin-
ciple that the fourteenth amendment affords no protection against
private discriminatory conduct, courts have consistently interpreted
the equal protection guarantee as protecting individuals from state
as opposed to private action! However, the concept of state action
or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or
desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline
to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his
absolute discretion, chooses.
"Person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and other legal
entities and their agents or representatives but does not include the State
or any subdivision thereof with respect to the sale, lease or rental of property
owned by it
"Real property" consists of any interest in real property of any kind or
quality, present or future, irrespective of how obtained or financed, which
is used, designed, constructed, zoned or otherwise devoted to or limited for
residential purposes whether as a single -family dwelling or as a dwelling
for two or more persons or families living together or independently of each
other.
This Article shall not apply to the obtaining of property by eminent do-
main pursuant to Article I, Sections 14 and 14 of this Constitution, nor to
the renting or providing of any accommodations for lodging purposes by a
hotel, motel or other similar public place engaged in furnishing lodging to
transient guests.
If any part or provision of this Article, or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Article, including
the application of such part or provision to other persons or circumstances,
shall not be affected thereby and shall continue in full force and effect. To
this end the provisions of this Article are severable.
6 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Sup. Ct. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L.
WEEK 3081 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1966) (No. 483). Prior to its enactment, the constitu-
tionality of the proposed amendment had been argued before this same court in Lewis
v. Jordon, Sac. 7549, Sup. Ct, June 3, 1964, but the court refused to decide the issue
at that time, although it noted that "grave constitutional questions" existed.
7109 U.S. 3 (1883).
8 See St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action,
Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MIcs-. L. REv. 993, 997
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sufficient to constitute a denial of equal protection has been broad-
ened and now includes not only the executive and legislative acts of
the state9 but also the following acts: judicial enforcement of re-
strictive covenants;' ° the leasing of premises by a municipal author-
ity under circumstances showing considerable public participation;"
municipal ordinances; 2 public statements by city officials;' quasi-
public actions by a private corporation; 4 municipal operation of a
purported private park;' 5 and state health regulations. " More gen-
erally, state action has recently been defined as those state acts
which to some significant extent indicate a state's involvement in
discrimination.' Following this last definition the California
court in Mulkey held that the enactment of section 26 (and thus the
repeal of the fair housing laws) was "significant" state action, re-
quiring that the state assume responsibility for the authorized dis-
crimination.' 8
The court premised its argument on the statement that conduct
which is significant as state action must constitute action rather than
inaction.9 Further, the court felt that this action could be found
"where the state, in any meaningful way, [had] lent its processes to
the achievement of discrimination even though that goal was not
within the state's purpose."2  It followed, in the court's reasoning,
that the affirmative act of authorizing discrimination by the elec-
torate (as the law-making body) was considered as much state action
as if the state had itself legislated to impose the discrimination.2'
The question of whether such a position is tenable by federal
standards can only be decided by the Supreme Court;22 but it is
(1961). But see Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit
on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLTJM. L. REv. 855,865-67 (1966).
9 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
10 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
"1 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
12 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
'3 Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
14 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
1 5 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
16Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
1 7 Burton v. Wilmington Park Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
18 Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 834, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 890 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
19 Id. at 830, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
26Id. at 831, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
21 Id. at 834, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
22 Certiorari has been requested of the Supreme Court in the California decision.
Mulkey v. Reitman, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3081 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1966) (No. 483).
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submitted that the Mulkey concept of state action will not be ac-
ceptable. Nevertheless, the result of Mulkey (in declaring the stat-
ute unconstitutional) should be the same on appeal, since section 26,
as a whole,2" endorses practices which by federal standards are
dearly violative of equal protection. For example, section 26, by
repealing those acts which prohibited discrimination in public-
assisted housing, now impliedly authorizes such discrimination. In
this situation, however, state action, defined by reference to federal
standards, could readily be found since the state could be considered
a joint venturer in the creation of housing and should therefore be
required to ensure that the availability of such housing not be deter-
mined on the basis of race.24 Likewise, a lease of property from the
state or a political subdivision, or assistance in financing the acquisi-
tion of real property, might color the transaction as state action.2 5
It is also to be noted that since the California statutes regarding real
property covenants were not expressly overruled by section 26, the
possibility exists that an indirect abridgement of the right to sell as
expressed by section 26 would come as a result of the state's failure
to enforce a restrictive covenant. Thus, one could discriminate
and yet have a cause of action 'to enforce his state constitutional
right to do as he wishes with his property as provided in sec-
tion 26. However, as state enforcement of racially restrictive cove-
nants is dearly contrary to the Supreme Court decisions in Shelley v.
Kraemer2" and Barrows v. Jackson,27 section 26 would be an uncon-
stitutional denial of equal protection.
Although section 26 is now unconstitutional, the test of state
action advanced by the Mulkey decision will be unacceptable not
only from the view of prior decisions but also because of its ultimate
2 3 The California court hinted that portions of the amendment might have been
constitutional, but noted that these portions were not severable from the amendment
since such a separation would create the danger of an uncertain or vague future appli-
cation of the amendment. 413 P.2d at 835, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
2 4 Discrimination in public-assisted housing was at issue in Peyton v. Barrington
Plaza Corp., 413 P.2d 849, 50 Cal. Rptr. 905 (Sup. Ct 1966), decided the same day
as Mulkey. There the court said that "the 'state action' . . . evident in Mulkey
without this facet of state participation [the public assistance) is thus even more posi-
tively identified .... ." Id. at 851, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 907. See also Redevelopment
Agency v. Buckman, 64 Cal. 2d 603, 413 P.2d 856, 50 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1966); Simkins
v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). But see Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 App. Div. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 981 (1950); O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 58 Wash.
2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
2 5 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
26334 U.S. 1 (1948).
27 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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effect upon the legislative processes. As the dissent points out, the
concept of state action propounded in Mulkey is not derived from
past Supreme Court rulings as easily as the majority asserts, for the
problem in Mulkey is clearly distinguishable from those presented
in the prior cases.28 The injury to the plaintiffs in Mulkey is not in
the nature of a state-imposed injury which the Court sought to avoid
in such cases as Shelley and Barrows, wherein "willing buyer -
willing seller" relationships were preserved by the refusal of the
Court to enforce the restrictive covenants. Nor is Mulkey com-
parable to those situations in which the state provided or contributed
certain services to the public,29 delegated its powers to private
corporations,"° or itself promoted discrimination." Rather, the es-
sence of the state's action in the Mulkey situation was to avoid state
involvement in private decisions."
The other apparent defect in Mulkey stems from its effect upon
the legisative process. From the court's reasoning, it can be asserted
that no state action would have been found had the legislature not
enacted any legislation prohibiting discrimination in housing. But
having once established the protective measures, any actions repeal-
ing such legislation are said to be prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment, since the repealing constitutes state involvement in
discrimination. The legislature is thus placed on a one-way street
in which it must either remain at rest or move forward with ir-
retraceable steps. Such regulation of the state legislature would
seem to be inappropriate under the federal state-action doctrine,
since the states have no direct obligation to secure the rights in-
volved. If the Constitution requires the states to affirmatively se-
cure these rights, then section 26 represents a dereliction of duty,
but where there is no obligation to secure such rights, it would seem
that the state should be allowed to take a neutral position, even
after previously committing itself in a particular direction. Further-
more, this position is inconsistent with settled law. Courts are
not to impose their social and economic beliefs upon the law-
makers; 3 rather, the legislators enjoy absolute discretion in
their functions, subject only to the state and federal constitu-
28 413 P.2d at 838, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 894 (dissenting opinion).
29 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
30 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
31 See Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Peterson v. City of Greenville,
373 U.S. 244 (1963).
32 413 P.2d at 841, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (dissenting opinion).
33 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
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tions." Therefore, if a neutral position taken by a state is
not prohibited by the Constitution, then that state should be allowed
to restore that position if its civil rights laws have been found unsat-
isfactory. Aside from these factors, a strong argument based on
public policy can be advanced in criticism of the Mulkey decision.
The possibility of the "irreversible" label being placed on a given
enactment not only disrupts the legislative function but also may
have the undesirable effect of forestalling any new legislation by
both state and federal bodies. Legislators, contemplating new civil
rights laws, may feel compelled to drop such efforts; thus Mulkey
would inhibit those same policies it seeks to promote.
It is also submitted that the Mulkey position is but a short step
from the abrogation of the existing federal state-action doctrine.
Having placed the legislature on a one-way street, the next logical
step would seem to be reinterpretation of the fourteenth amendment
to require affirmative action in preventing private discriminatory
conduct. It may, in fact, be inevitable (with or without the Mulkey
result) that the Supreme Court will establish this affirmative obliga-
tion. 5 Some recent authorities advocate that the fourteenth amend-
ment was originally intended to establish this direct approach to-
ward the attainment of civil rights, rather than that embodied in the
state-action doctrine3 ' Under this "new" interpretation, "the con-
stitutional wrong... is not the act of the individual, but the failure
of the state to take adequate steps to prevent it, or afford redress.""7
Such a position might be consistent with other governmental con-
cerns (in education and employment for example) where a heavy
public interest in the availability of the fundamental necessities of
life is involved; 8 however, many recent cases before the Supreme
Court, notably the Sit-in Cases of 1963"° and 1964,40 have not indi-
cated that such a conclusion, at least with regard to public accomo-
34 1 COOLEY, CONSTTUIONAL LIMITATIONS 175 (8th ed. 1927).
35 See Silard, supra note 8, at 855.
36 Frantz, Congressional Power To Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Pri-
vate Acts, 73 YALE LJ. 1353 (1964); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the
"State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855
(1966).
3 7 Frantz, supra note 36, at 1359.
38 See Silard, supra note 36, at 870.
39 The 1963 cases are enumerated in Lewis, The Sit-in Cases: Great Expectations,
in 1963 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 101 n.1 (Kurland ed.), the principal case be-
ing Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
40 As listed in Paulsen, The Sit-in Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None,"
in 1964 THE SuPREME COURT REvIEW 137 n.1 (Kurland ed.), they are: Griffin v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964);
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dations, is forthcoming.4 The Sit-in Cases continued to rely on the
state-action doctrine, the opinions being based primarily upon tech-
nical grounds, while the larger question, that of the existence of a
self-executing federal right to equal treatment by proprietors of pri-
vate establishments, was left undecided." Furthermore, the pas-
sage of the public accomodations section of the Civil Rights Act of
1964"3 may have effectively postponed the question for some time,
since the Court can now rely on congressional guidelines to define
the rights of citizens in the use of public accomodations.44
An exception to this conclusion might be found, however, in
the 1966 case of United States v. Guest.4 Therein, the Supreme
Court was asked to uphold an indictment which in part accused
private citizens, not acting under color of law, of a conspiraoy6 to
intimidate Negro citizens in the exercise and enjoyment of their
right of interstate travel. Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the ma-
jority, recognized that rights under the equal protection clause could
arise only when state action was involved." He felt that although
cases previously had dealt only with governmental interference with
the right to travel,48 the reasoning of the prior cases supported the
conclusion that "the constitutional right of interstate travel ... [was]
secured against interference from any source whatever, whether gov-
ernmental or private."49 Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opin-
ion, felt that the existence of such a right was dubious at best, espe-
Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964);
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
41 Lewis, The Sit-in Cases: Great Expectations, in 1963 THE SUPREME COURT RE-
VIEW 101 (Kurland ed.); Paulsen, The Sit-in Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There
None," in 1964 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 137 (Kurland ed.).42 Lewis, supra note 41, at 101-02. See also Silard, supra note 36, at 865-66. In
the various cases, state action was found, for example, in city ordinances, Peterson v.
City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); in public statements by city officials, Lombard
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); in the actions of a private guard who identified
himself as a deputy sheriff, Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); and in state
health regulations requiring segregated facilities, Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153
(1964).
43 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
44 Heyman, Civil Rights 1964 Term: Responses to Direct Action, in 1965 THE
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 159 (Kurland ed.).
45 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
46 The federal statute makes it a crime for two or more persons to "conspire to in-
jure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States."
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
47383 U.S. at 755.
481d. at 759-60.
49 1d. at 759-60 n.17.
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dally since Congress held powers derived from other sources which
were sufficient to prevent the discrimination." The broad language
of Guest, however, may not be a persuasive precedent in fair housing
litigation, since the right of interstate travel has long enjoyed favor-
able public sentiment, while the right of freedom from discrimina-
tion in housing has only recently gained attention.
Nevertheless, a right to be free from discrimination in housing,
though not explicitly granted in the Constitution, has been estab-
lished in some forms by both state and federal legislatures. 1 As ex-
pressed by Congress, it is a right "to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property."" Like the right to
the use of public accomodations, it is a right to procure a share of
that which is available to the general public and which by any sense
of decency should be available to the entire public. But there is
also prescribed a right to sell (or not to sell), and it may be that an
absolute right to buy any realty in the market may effectively de-
stroy a right to sell, just as an interpretation favoring the right to sell
has denied nonwhites the right to buy.
In any event, a reinterpretation of the fourteenth amendment by
the Supreme Court for the purpose of finding an obligation on the
states to prevent discrimination is considered an unwise choice by
some authorities, since the resulting litigation, crammed between
judge-made guidelines, would burden the Court with a task which
should rightfully be performed by the Congress."o
Assuming, then, that the current state-action theory is still ap-
proved by the Court, while the elimination of discrimination is an
honorable result, it is possible that congressional legislation, as in
1964, will allow the Court to avoid the "self-executing right" ques-
GO ld. at 762.
5114 Stat. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964); OHIo REV. CODE § 4112.01-.02
(Supp. 1965). Ohio is one of the seventeen states that have enacted fair housing laws.
ALAsKA STAT. § 11.60.230 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-5 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (Supp. 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-901 (Supp.
1966); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1301 (Supp. 1966); MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
151B, § 4 (Supp. 1965); MCH. STAT. ANN. § 28.343 (1962); MINN. STAT. § 363.03
(Supp. 1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-4
to -5 (Supp. 1964); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 18; ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.033 (1953);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1664 (1964); RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-37-4 (Supp.
1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.60
(Supp. 1966). Most of these laws are discussed in Pearl & Terner, Survey: Fair Hous-
ing Laws - Design for Equal Opportunity, 16 STAN. L. REV. 849 (1964). Also of
interest is Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
52 14 Stat 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
53Paulsen, supra note 41, at 170; Silard, supra note 36, at 871.
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tion. It is therefore logical to ask whether Congress has the power
to enact such legislation.
The constitutionality of laws prohibiting private discrimination
in housing can be discussed in relation to at least two sources, the
commerce clause and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
Whether such laws should be enacted, however, may properly re-
quire the consideration of the conflicting interests of the private
parties involved as well as the public interest in securing private
housing for the discriminatee" It is well established that Congress
has vast powers in controlling interstate commerce and intrastate
activities which bear on that commerce." Since the transportation of
building materials and the general availability of reasonable financ-
ing arrangements can be shown as part of that commerce,' it is
therefore reasonable that those persons who are in the business of
developing and selling real estate should be subject to regulation,
even though their businesses may operate wholly intrastate. As
with public accomodations, the public interest in disallowing dis-
crimination in a national housing market perhaps outweighs the
motives of individual investors who would seek to maintain a high
profit margin by insuring to white buyers that the neighborhood
would remain white.
Regulation of the individual owner presents a more difficult
problem, however. The owner of a large multi-unit dwelling may
be said to have such a significant involvement (in terms of the total
housing market) as to be subject to regulation, since here again his
motive is essentially one of profit."7 Such a distinction is not dearly
defined, however, in the case of the average homeowner, who enters
the market only occasionally, with the primary hope of getting the
best price possible. It is true that he enters a national market.
Also, the interests he asserts in discriminating among prospective
buyers are most likely not his own but rather those of his neighbors.
54 See Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Pri-
vate" Housing, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 5 (1964), wherein the author thoroughly dis-
cusses the various interests involved.
55 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
5 6 See New York Lawyer's Ass'n, Report on Civil Rights Act of 1966, S. DoG. No.
3296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15989 (1966).
5 7 In Ohio, an owner of "commercial housing" may not discriminate on the basis
of race in choosing his tenants. OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.02(H) (Supp. 1965).
Within the act a building occupied by more than "two individuals, two groups, or two
families living independently of each other," or any housing not occupied by the owner
as a bona fide residence, would be "commercial housing" subject to the fair housing
provisions. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4112.01 (K), (L) (Supp. 1966).
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However, even though a relationship has not been dearly shown be-
tween integration and the decline of property values,58 the neigh-
bors' interests in this regard (as well as the personal feelings of the
seller) should be considered, and it is submitted that the commerce
clause does not provide the proper setting for the weighing of these
factors.
Regulation of the individual property owner may properly be
derived from section 5 of the fourteenth amendment which
empowers Congress to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of that amendment. Correctly viewed, it "is a positive grant
of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."5 If a right to be free
from private discrimination in the conveyance of real property is guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment, section 5 would therefore pro-
vide proper ground for congressional action. An analogous ques-
tion was raised in regard to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.0 The
Supreme Court, however, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
- States"' avoided an answer and validated that act solely on the basis
of the commerce clause, although the opinion did not deny that the
act could have been based on the powers granted Congress by section
5 of the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Douglas was more di-
rect in his concurring opinion, noting that "the right of people to
be free of state action that discriminates against them... 'occupies a
more protected position in our constitutional system than does the
movement of cattle.' ,,62 The Supreme Court's reluctance to declare
section 5 as a basis for the act does not necessarily indicate an
unwillingness to so hold but perhaps reflects a hope that Congress
will establish the logical relationships and prepare findings upon
which an affirmative decision can be based.63 The recent case of
Katzenbach v. Morgan," which upheld section 4 (e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1966,5 stated that "by including section 5 [in the four-
58 Horowitz, supra note 54, at 33.
59 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
60 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
61379 U.S. 241 (1964).
62 Id. at 279. (Citing and quoting from the concurring opinion in the 1941 case
of Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177.)
63 Congressional interest was evident in the House-approved 1966 Civil Rights Bill;
however, the bill died in the Senate after a motion for cloture did not receive the
required 2/3 majority vote. 112 CONG. REC. 22114 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1966).
64 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
6579 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (Supp. 1965).
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teenth amendment] the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a
specific provision... the same broad powers expressed in the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause [of the Constitution]."66 The intrusion of
the federal government upon state interests in that case was war-
ranted, since the Court could find a rational basis upon which Con-
gress resolved the conflict before it. 7 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting,
stated that the effect of the decision was to give Congress the power
to define the scope of the amendment and therefore might allow it
to dilute as well as enlarge the provision,68 but he also noted that "to
the extent 'legislative facts' are relevant to a judicial determina-
tion,... [they are] entitled to due respect." 9 It would seem, then,
that the way is open for Congress, through section 5, to present the
necessary "legislative facts" to establish the relationship between the
buyer and seller of real property. This approach should be ap-
proved over the Supreme Court's use of the equal protection clause
"to write into the Constitution its notions of what it thinks is good
governmental policy."7
It has been submitted herein that the underlying problem in
Mulkey v. Reitman,71 that of preventing racial discrimination in
housing, can be solved more effectively by congressional determina-
tions than by court decisions. Although section 26, as a whole,
was declared unconstitutional, the reasoning advanced by the Cali-
fornia court to reach that result seems unacceptable, not only be-
cause of a faulty basis in precedent but also because of the un-
desirable results the decision may have upon the legislatures.
Furthermore, adopting the Mulkey concepts and thereby preparing
for the next step, that of abrogating the doctrine of state action, may
force the courts to accept a considerable burden. A more acceptable
result could be achieved by declaring section 26 unconstitutional on
the narrow grounds suggested above, thereby retaining the integrity
of the state-action doctrine. Congressional legislation, based partly
on the commerce clause but primarily upon section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment, would then allow the Supreme Court to avoid
06 384 U.S. at 650.
67Id. at 655-56.
68Id. at 668 (dissenting opinion).
69 Ibid.
7 0 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
71413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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an outright abrogation of the state-action doctrine, while providing
a forum in which all the conflicting interests involved could be
heard and weighed.
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